Abstract
Gorani refers alternately to a subgroup of the Iranian languages spoken in the borderlands between Iraq and Iran with small islands of speakers stippling the map from the Iranian border to Nineveh or to a literary standard used widely until the decline of the Ardalan dynasty in the 19th century. Here, we explore both these uses of the term to understand the place of Gorani varieties among the regional languages. The role of Gorani has, at times, been the local idiom of minoritized groups or a prestigious literary standard. Gorani and its speakers have substantially impacted its neighbors, including Neo-Aramaic, Southern and Central Kurdish, and Laki. It has been the chosen literary language and spoken vernacular of various religious groups. The conservative character of Gorani varieties has made it essential to understand Iranian dialectology. Here, we explore all aspects of Gorani, explicitly focusing on its diachronic and sociolinguistic developments and the history of its study.
Published in Gorani in its historical and linguistic context
This chapter looks more closely into the issue of Kurdish language rights, education, and public image during the AKP years. This is central to the Kurdish issue: the Kurdish language has been a key marker of a contested identity, and its usage a de facto political stance. The desire for language recognition and education rights have been at the core of the Kurdish question, its resolution attempts and its failures, as we shall see. The essay is based on the analysis of media coverage of the issue, as well as the now large body of literature on Kurdish language policy in Turkey. Among this literature, it is particularly worth mentioning the recent doctoral thesis of Ronayi Önen Baykuşak, which presents an original and extremely rich analysis of the Kurdish language policies in Turkey in the 20th and 21st centuries. The chapter first examines the different steps that enabled the more widespread use of the Kurdish language under the AKP government from 2002. It then looks into the mobilisations for Kurdish language rights – in particular those that have taken place since the collapse of the peace process in 2015 – as well as the struggle for Kurdish to be officially recognised in Turkey. In the final section, I shall examine the public image of the Kurds and the Kurdish language in Turkey today, showing that Kurdish is once again denigrated and portrayed as the language of backwardness, separatism, and terror, leading to new restrictions on language use and attacks on Kurdish speakers.
The present study targets language choice and language attitudes among Kurdish speakers in the multi-lingual city of Duhok (Kurdistan Region of Iraq). While the main language of wider communication in Duhok city is the Bahdini dialect of Kurmanji, several languages (Bahdini, Sorani, Arabic, and English) have been used as the language of instruction in education during different periods of time, yielding an age-graded, multi-lingual community. Within such a community, diferent languages are selected for diferent settings (with diferent interlocutors, and in diferent contexts), and exercising language choice seems to be a natural, automatic and unplanned process, with obvious parallels to the choice of an appropriate register, genre, style, medium, or tone of voice in any communicative setting (Dweik & Qawar 2015). To date, no empirical sociolinguistic research of this nature has been conducted in Duhok, or indeed in any urban center of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In this chapter, we present the frst results of an ongoing research project that focuses on the sociolinguistic variable of age, across a variety of attitudinal and usage-based parameters.
This article aims at exploring the minority status of Kurdish language in Turkey. It asks two main questions: (1) In what ways have state policies and socio-historical conditions influenced the evolution of linguistic behavior of Kurdish speakers? (2) What are the mechanisms through which language maintenance versus language shift tendencies operate in the speech community? The article discusses the objective dimensions of the language situation in the Kurdish region of Turkey. It then presents an account of daily language practices and perceptions of Kurdish speakers. It shows that language use and choice are significantly related to variables such as age, gender, education level, rural versus urban dwelling and the overall socio-cultural and political contexts of such uses and choices. The article further indicates that although the general tendency is to follow the functional separation of languages, the language situation in this context is not an example of stable diglossia, as Turkish exerts its increasing presence in low domains whereas Kurdish, by contrast, has started to infringe into high domains like media and institutions. The article concludes that the prevalent community bilingualism evolves to the detriment of Kurdish, leading to a shift-oriented linguistic situation for Kurdish.
This article addresses Young Turk language policy towards Kurdish in the interwar period. It argues that most Young Turk nationalists treated Turkey’s Kurdish minority as assimilable raw ethnic material, as a result of which Kurds became the object of large-scale cultural and linguistic policies aimed at “Turkification”. This article charts how these language policies infringed upon Kurdish life. It will (a) briefly introduce the Young Turk cultural revolution of 1913–1950, (b) discuss how the Young Turk dictatorship perceived the Turkish language as a vehicle for cultural assimilation, and (c) provide a detailed account of one ex–ample of a boarding school for Kurdish children. It concludes that there is evidence that a policy of cultural genocide against Kurds was implemented but relativizes its impact by discussing the Kurds’ ambivalent reception of those policies
This article examines the Turkish state’s assimilationist policy towards the Kurds and the Kurdish language in Turkey. It studies how the Turkish nationalist elites, the Kemalists, have throughout the 20th century systematically suppressed the Kurdish language as part of their aim to construct a homogenous nation-state of Turkish speakers. It shows that this linguicidal policy was strongly informed by the traumatic collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the consequent Kemalist emphasis on complete ethno-linguistic homogeneity as criteria for being “Turkish”, “Western” and “civilised”. The article discusses the various “Turkification” strategies of the authorities, such as banning the Kurdish language, the denial of the existence of the Kurds, changing the names of towns and villages, the forced resettlement of Kurds and the assimilation of Kurdish children. It critically analyses the recent developments in Turkey’s Kurdish language policy and the reform efforts of the current government as part of the country’s EU candidacy. The article reflects however, that whilst looking good on paper, these reforms have had little impact in reality and Kurdish speakers in Turkey are still systematically denied their basic human and linguistic rights.
Zygmunt Bauman, Alexander Laban Hilton and Paul Havemann, amongst others, have argued that genocide is intimately linked to modernity. Modern discourses on development, modernization and western science as well as key meta-narratives of modernity (advancing the teleological myth of progress and civilization), “gardener’s visions” and the very categorization and standardization of national languages (crucial to the biopolitical formation of global populations under the system of modern nation-states) have all legitimated and effected policies and practices that have been genocidal in their nature and scope. This article examines and details the extent to which all these identified aspects of modernity can be observed in the case of Turkey. The findings indicate that linguistic/cultural and physical genocide of Kurds in Turkey has taken place (over the past eight and a half decades) as a direct consequence of the Kemalist/Ataturkist modernity project. Language policy – which has advocated linguistic imperialism alongside linguistic genocide – has been a critical tool for the creation of the modern Turkish nation-state.
Kurdish has four “geographical” dialects divided arbitrarily and forcibly among five neighboring countries of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Armenia. It has three literary dialects, two standardizing varieties, numerous norms and three alphabets. Further complicating this linguistic landscape since 1918 is the crisscrossing of dialect areas by international borders and subjecting them to state policies ranging from linguicide (Turkey, Iran, Syria) to officialization on the local (Iraq before 2005; USSR) and national levels (Iraq since 2005). Under these conditions, dialect divisions were overshadowed by the linguicidal situation which threatened the survival of the language. The formation of the Kurdistan Regional Government in 1991 and the officialization of Kurdish as one of the two state languages of Iraq in 2005 have removed the external (state) threat, and raised, once more, the question of the dialect base of the standard language. While Iraqi rulers had in the past used dialect pluralism as justification for denying Kurdish official status, now the Kurds themselves have to cope with the linguistic fragmentation of their nation. This article examines the conflict over the adoption of one or two of the major dialects, Sorani and Kurmanji, as the official standard language in Iraq.
It has been claimed that the 1979 revolution in Iran transformed the country in many respects. This article aims to examine the extent to which the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has deviated, if at all, from the linguicidal policies of the Pahlavi dynasty towards non-Persian languages in Iran. The article finds, in both the monarchical and IRI regimes, a policy of (a) treating multilingualism as a threat to the country’s territorial integrity and national unity, (b) restricting the use of non-Persian languages, and (3) promoting the supremacy of Persian as a venue for unifying the ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous body politic. While the continuity in the language policy of the two regimes is prominent, dif–ferences will be noted especially in the changing geolinguistic context of the region where Kurdish has achieved the status of an official language in Iraq (since 2005) and has enjoyed some level of tolerance in the linguicidal Turkish state (since 1991). New communication technologies as well as cross-border social and linguistic networking among the Kurds throughout Kurdistan and the world have changed the language environment but not the official policy of “one-nation = one-language”. Persianization of non-Persian peoples continues to be the build–ing block of the Islamic regime’s language policy